The modal logic S4 can be used via a Curry-Howard style correspondence to obtain a λ-calculus. Modal (boxed) types are intuitively interpreted as 'closed syntax of the calculus'. This λ-calculus is called modal type theory -this is the basic case of a more general contextual modal type theory, or CMTT.
Introduction
The box modality from modal logic has proven its usefulness in logic. It admits various logical and semantic interpretations in the spirit of 'we know that' or 'we can prove that' or 'in the future it will be the case that'. A nice historical overview of modal logic, which also considers the specific impact of computer science, is in [BdRV01, Subsection 1.7].
CMTT (contextual modal type theory) is a typed λ-calculus based via the Curry-Howard correspondence on the modal logic S4. The box modality becomes a type-former, and box types are intuitively interpreted as 'closed syntax of'.
So CMTT has types for programs that generate CMTT syntax. Because of this, CMTT has been applied to meta-programming, but it has independent interest as a language, designed according to rigorous mathematical principles and in harmony with modal logic, which interprets in a programming rather than a logical context. Box types are types of the syntax of terms.
Until now this has not been backed up by a denotational semantics in which box types really are populated by the syntax of terms. In this paper, we do that: our intuitions are realised in the denotational semantics in a direct and natural, and also unexpected, manner.
The denotation is interesting from the point of view of the interface between logic and programming. Furthermore, we exploit the denotation to prove properties of the language, showing how denotations are not only illuminating but can also serve for new proof-methods.
Keeping it simple
This paper considers two related systems:
• The purely modal system, based on box types like A.
• The contextual modal system, based on 'boxes containing types' like [A 1 , A 2 ]B-the reader might like to think of the contextual system as a multimodal logic [GKWZ03, Subsection 1.4] (whose modalities are themselves indexed over propositions).
Broadly speaking, the purely modal system is nicer to study but a little too simple. The contextual modal system generalises the purely modal system and gives it slightly more expressive power, but it can be a little complicated; not obscure, just long to write out.
Therefore, we open this paper with the modal system, make the main point of our denotation in the simplest and clearest possible manner-the reader who wants to jump right in and work backwards could do worse than start with the example denotations in Subsection 3.3.2 onwards-and then we consider the contextual system as the maths becomes more advanced. Section 2 presents syntax and typing of the modal system and Section 5 does the same for the contextual modal system; Section 3 gives modal denotations and Section 6 gives contextual modal denotations.
The developments are parallel, but not identical. Where proofs are not very different between the modal and contextual systems, we omit routine repetition. We consider reduction of the modal system in Section 4 but not reduction of the contextual system. Also, we develop the important notion of shapeliness only for the contextual system in Section 7; it is obvious how the modal case would be a special case.
Key ideas
Our main technical results are Theorems 3.14 and 6.10, and Corollary 7.7. However, just looking at these results may be misleading; the key technical ideas that make these results work, and indeed contribute to making them interesting, occur beforehand.
So it might be useful to list some of the key ideas in the paper. This list is not an exhaustive technical overview, so much as clues for the reader who wants to gain some quick insight and navigate the mathematics. Here are some of the main points that make the mathematics in this paper different and distinctive:
• Inflation in the case of A in Figure 3 , and the 'tail of' semantics of X @ in Figure 4 . This is discussed in Remark 3.5.
• Proposition 2.23 and the fact that it is needed for soundness of the denotation.
• The remarkable Proposition 3.13, in which valuations get turned into substitutions and closed syntax in the denotation interacts directly with the typing system. This is a kind of dual to the interaction seen in Proposition 2.23.
• The denotation of [A i ]A in Figure 8 , which in the context of the rest of the paper is very natural.
• The notion of shapeliness in Definition 7.1 and the 'soundness result' Proposition 7.6.
We discuss all of these in the body of the paper.
1.3. On intuitions 1.3.1. 'Syntax' means syntax
One early difficulty the authors of this paper faced was in communication, because we sometimes used terms synonymously without realising that the words were so slippery.
The intuition we give to A is self-reflectively closed syntax of the language itself. This is a distinct intuition from 'computations', 'code', 'values', or 'intensions', because these are not necessarily intended self-reflectively.
It is very important not to confuse this intuition with apparently similar intuitions expressed as 'code of A', 'values of A', 'computations of A', or 'intension of A'. These are not quite the same thing. It may be useful to briefly survey them here:
• 'Code of A' is an ambiguous term; this is often understood as precompiled code or bytecode, rather than syntax of the original language. See [WLP98] for a system based on that intuition.
• 'Values of A' is a dangerous intuition and there probably should be a law against it:
depending on whom one is speaking with, this could be synonymous in their mind with 'normal forms of A' (a syntactic notion) or 'denotations of A' (a non-syntactic notion). Matters become even worse if one's interlocuteur assumes that denotations may be silently added to syntax as constants (fine for mathematicians; not so fine for programmers). More than one conversation has been corrupted by the associated misunderstandings.
• For a discussion of 'computation of A' see the Related Work in the Conclusions, where we discuss how this intuition can lead to a notion of Moggi-style monad.
• 'Intension of A' is similar to 'syntax of A', but significantly more general: there is no requirement that the intension be syntactic, or if it is syntactic, that it be the same calculus. One could argue that 'intension of' should also satisfy that the denotation of A be identical in some strong sense-e.g. be the same set as-to that of A, since taking an intension twice should reveal no further internal structure. (This does not match the denotation of this paper.) An interesting (and as far as we know unexplored) model of this intuition might be partial equivalence relations (PERs), where A takes A and forms the identity PER which is defined where A is defined. 1 Famously, PERs form a cartesian-closed category [AL91, Subsection 3.4.1].
In short: where the reader sees ' A', they should think 'raw syntax in type A'.
1 Alex Simpson and Paul Levy both independently suggested PERs when the first author sketched the ideas of this paper, and Simpson went further and suggested the specific model discussed above. We are grateful to Levy and Simpson for their comments, which prompted us to be specific about the intuition behind the particular denotation in this paper.
'Functions' means functions
It may be useful now to head off another possible confusion: where the reader sees A→B, they should think 'graph of a function'-not 'computable function', 'representable function', 'syntax of a function', or 'code of a function'.
All of these things are also possible, but in this paper our challence is to create a type system, language, and denotation which are 'epsilon away' from the simply-typed λ-calculus or (since we admit a type of truth-values) higher-order logic-and it just so happens that we also have modal types making precisely its own syntax into first-class data.
So: we are considering a 'foundations-flavoured' theory in which A→B represents all possible functions (in whatever foundation the reader prefers) from A to B, and we do not intend this paper to be 'programming-flavoured' in which A→B represents only that function(-code) or normal forms that can exist inside some computational device. And, A should represent, as much as possible, 'the syntax of our language/logic that types as A'.
Syntax and typing of the system with box types
We start by presenting the types, terms, and typing relation for the modal type system. This is the simplest version of the language that we want to give a denotational semantics for.
2.1. The basic syntax Definition 2.1. Fix two countably infinite sets of variables A and X. We will observe a permutative convention that a, b, c, . . . will range over distinct variables in A and X, Y, Z, . . . will range over distinct variables in X. We call a, b, c atoms and X, Y, Z unknowns.
Definition 2.2. Define types inductively by:
A ::= o | N | A→A | A Notation 2.3. By convention, if X and Y are sets we will write Y X for the set of functions from X to Y . This is to avoid any possible confusion between A→B (which is a type) and Y X (which is a set).
Remark 2.4.
• o will be a type of truth values; its denotation will be populated by truthvalues {⊥, }.
• N will be a type of natural numbers; its denotation will be populated by numbers {0, 1, 2, . . . }.
• A→B is a function type; its denotation will be populated by functions.
• A is a modal type; its denotation will be populated by syntax.
Definition 2.5. Fix a set of constants C to each of which is assigned a type type(C). We write C : A as shorthand for 'C is a constant and type(C) = A'. We insist that constants include the following:
We may also assume constants for N, such as 0 : N, succ : N→N, * : N→N→N and + : N→N→N, a fixedpoint combinator, we may write 1 for succ(0), and so on. 2 2 . . . so we follow the example of PCF [Mit96] .
We may omit type subscripts where they are clear from context or do not matter.
Definition 2.6. Define terms inductively by:
Constants C are, as standard in the λ-calculus, added as desired to represent logic and computational primitives. An atom a plays the role of a standard λ-calculus variable; it is λ-abstracted in a typed manner in λa:A.r. The term X @ means intuitively 'evaluate X' and r means intuitively 'the syntax r considered itself in the denotation'. Finally let X=s in r means intuitively 'set X to be the syntax calculated by s, in r'. Examples of this in action are given and discussed in Subsection 2.3.
Remark 2.7. The effect of r @ (which is not syntax) is obtained by let X=r in X @ . Likewise the effect of λX: A.r (which is not syntax) is obtained by λa: A.let X=a in r.
We cannot emulate let X=s in X @ using (λa:A.a @ )r. The expression 'a @ ' would mean 'evaluate the syntax a' rather than 'evaluate the syntax linked to a'. 3 Definition 2.8. Define free atoms fa(r) and free unknowns fu(r) by:
If fa(r) ∪ fu(r) = ∅ then we call r closed. Definition 2.9. We take a to be bound in r in λa:A.r and X to be bound in r in let X=s in r, and we take syntax up to α-equivalence as usual. We omit definitions but give examples:
• λa:A.a = λb:A.b.
As the use of an equality symbol above suggests, we identify terms up to α-equivalence. • A typing is a pair a : A or X : A.
• A typing context Γ is a finite partial function from A ∪ X to types.
• A typing sequent is a tuple Γ r : A of a typing context, a term, and a type. We use list notation for typing contexts, e.g. a:A, Y :B is the function mapping a to A and Y to B; and a:A ∈ Γ means that Γ(a) is defined and Γ(a) = A.
Define the valid typing sequents of the modal type system inductively by the rules in Figure 1 .
We discuss examples of typable terms in Subsection 2.3. The important rule is ( I), which tells us that if we have some syntax r and it has no free atoms, then we can box it as a denotation r of box type-any free unknowns X in r/ r get linked to further boxed syntax, which is expressed by ( E). Notation 2.11. We may write ∅ r : A just as r : A. Notation 2.12. If Γ is a typing context and U ⊆ A∪X then write Γ| U for Γ restricted to U . This is the partial function which is equal to Γ where it is defined, and dom(Γ| U ) = dom(Γ) ∩ U . Proposition 2.13 combines Weakening and Strengthening: Proposition 2.13. If Γ r : A and Γ | fu(r)∪fa(r) = Γ| fu(r)∪fa(r) then Γ r : A.
Proof. By a routine induction on r.
Examples of terms typable in the modal system
We are now ready to discuss intuitions about this syntax; for a more formal treatment see Section 3 which develops the denotational semantics. We start with some short examples and then consider more complex terms.
Short examples
1. Assume constants ¬ : o→o and ∧ : o→o→o, where ∧ is written infix as usual. Then we can type
Intuitively these represents the syntax transformations P → ¬P , P, Q → P ∧ Q, and P → P ∧ P . 2. This program takes syntax of type A and evaluates it:
∅ λa: A.let X=a in X @ : A→A This corresponds to the modal logic axiom (T). 3. Expanding on the previous example, this program takes syntax for a function and an argument, evaluates the syntax and applies the function to the argument:
This program takes syntax of type A tagged with , and adds an extra so that it becomes syntax of type A:
This corresponds to the modal logic axiom (4).
There is no natural term of type A→ A
We can try to give λa:o. a the type A→ A, but we fail because the typing context a:o does not satisfy fa(a) = ∅.
Our denotation of Figures 3 and 4 illustrates that it is not in general possible to invert the evaluation map from Subsection 2.3.1 and thus map A to A. This is Corollary 3.15. 5 So
• there is a canonical map A→A (syntax to denotation)-we saw this map in part 1 of this example-but • not in general an inverse map A→ A (denotation to syntax).
A term for Axiom K
Axiom K, also called the normality axiom [BdRV01, Definition 1.39, Subsection 1.6]; its type is (A→B)→ A→ B.
We can write a term of this type. Intuitively, the term below takes syntax for a function and syntax for an argument, and produces syntax for the function applied to the argument:
Remark 2.14. We exhibited terms of type A→A, A→ A, and (A→B)→ A→ B, so Figure 1 implements (at least) the deductive power of an intuitionistic variant of S4 [BdRV01, Subsection 4.1, page 194]. 6 5 For sufficiently 'small' types this may be possible by specific constructions; see Example 3.16. 6 The list of axioms of [BdRV01, page 194 ] uses ♦ instead of . A most remarkable family of theorems of Kripke semantics for modal logic relates geometric properties of the Kripke frame's accessibility relation with logical properties of the modalities. Axiom (K) is satisfied by all frames. Axiom (T) expresses geometrically that accessibility is reflexive. Axiom (4) expresses that accessibility is transitive.
The reader familiar with category theory may also ask whether can be viewed as a comonad, since A→A and A→ A look like the types of a counit and comultiplication (and perhaps (A→B)→ A→ B looks like the action of a functor). We return to this in Section 8.
The example of exponentiation
This is a classic example of meta-programming: write a function that takes a number n and returns syntax for the function x ∈ N → x n .
Assuming a combinator for primitive recursion over natural numbers and using some standard sugar, the following term implements exponentiation:
However, the term above generates β-reducts. The reader can see this because of the ' λb:N.b * (X @ b)' above. This application X @ b is trapped under a and will not reduce.
Looking ahead to the reduction relation in Figure 5 , exp 2 reduces to 
Substitution
Definition 2.15. An (atoms-)substitution σ is a finite partial function from atoms A to terms. σ will range over atoms-substitutions. Write dom(σ) for the set {a | σ(a) defined} Write id for the identity substitution, such that dom(σ) = ∅. Write [a:=t] for the map taking a to t and undefined elsewhere. An (unknowns-)substitution θ is a finite partial function from unknowns X to terms such that for every X, if X ∈ dom(θ) then θ(X) = r for some r with fa(r) = ∅.
θ will range over unknowns-substitutions. We write dom(θ), id, and [X:=t] just as for atoms-substitutions.
Definition 2.16. Define
Remark 2.17. Where θ is defined, it maps X specifically to terms the form r with fa(r) = ∅. This is because ' r with fa(r) = ∅' is the syntax inhabiting modal types. If we consider another class of syntax (e.g. in the contextual system of Section 5 onwards), then the corresponding notion of unknowns-substitution changes in concert with that.
Definition 2.18 describes how atoms and unknowns get instantiated. We discuss it in Remark 2.20 but one point is important above all others: if θ(X) = s then X @ θ is equal to s . So a very simple reduction/computation is 'built in' to the substitution action for unknowns, that ( s ) @ → s . 7 Lemma 2.19 illustrates a nice corollary of the point discussed in Remark 2.17. It will be useful later in Proposition 3.13.
Lemma 2.19. fa(rθ) = fa(r).
Proof. By a routine induction on r using our assumption of Definition 2.15 that if X ∈ dom(θ) then fa(θ(X)) = ∅. • The two capture avoidance side-conditions c ∈ fa(σ) and Y ∈ fu(θ) can always be guaranteed by renaming.
• We write ( r)σ = (rσ). This is computationally wasteful in the sense that the sidecondition fa(r) = ∅ on ( I) (Figure 1 ) guarantees that for typable terms (which is what we care about) rσ = r. We prefer to keep basic definitions orthogonal from such optimisations, but this is purely a design choice (and see the next item in this list).
• We write (λc:A.r)θ = λc:A.(rθ) without any side-condition that c should avoid capture by atoms in θ. This is because Definition 2.15 insists that fa(θ(X)) = ∅ always, so there can be no capture to avoid.
Recall the definition of [a:=s] from Definition 2.15. Lemma 2.21 is a standard lemma which will be useful later:
Definition 2.22 and Proposition 2.23 are needed for Proposition 3.13. Definition 2.22. Suppose Γ is a typing context and θ is an unknowns substitution. Write Γ θ when if X ∈ dom(θ) then X: A ∈ Γ for some A and Γ θ(X) : A.
Proposition 2.23 is needed for Theorem 3.14 (soundness of the denotation). It is slightly unusual that soundness of typing under substitution should be needed for soundness under taking denotations. But the syntax is going to be part of the denotational semantics-that is its point-and so substitution is part of how this denotation is calculated (see the case of r in Figure 4) . Proof. By a routine induction on the typing of r. We consider four cases:
• The case of ( I). Suppose Γ r : A and fa(r) = ∅ so that Γ r : A by ( I). By inductive hypothesis Γ rθ : A. By Lemma 2.19 also fa(rθ) = ∅. We use ( I) and the fact that ( r)θ = (rθ), and Proposition 2.13.
• The case of (Ext) for X ∈ dom(θ). By assumption in Definition 2.15, θ(X) = r for some r with fa(r ) = ∅. By assumption in Definition 2.22 ∅ θ(X) : A. By Definition 2.18 (X @ )θ = r . By Proposition 2.13 Γ r : A as required.
• The case of (→I). Suppose Γ, a:A r : B so that by (→I) Γ λa:A.r : A→B. By inductive hypothesis Γ, a:A rθ : B. We use (→I).
• The case of ( E). Suppose Γ, X: A r : B and Γ s : A so that by ( E) Γ let X=s in r : B. Renaming if necessary, suppose X ∈ dom(θ). By inductive hypothesis Γ, X: A rθ : B and Γ sθ : A. We use ( E) and the fact that (let X=s in r)θ = let X=sθ in rθ.
Denotational semantics for types and terms of the modal type system
We now develop a denotational semantics of the types and terms from Definitions 2.2 and 2.6. The main definitions are in Figures 3 and 4. The design is subtle, so there follows an extended discussion of the definition.
Denotation of types
Definition 3.1. Define A the interpretation of types by induction in Figure 3 .
Remark 3.2. o is a pair of truth-values, and N is the set of natural numbers. B
A is a function-space. 8 No surprises here. z ∈ A is a pair ( r, x). We suggest the reader think of this as
• some syntax r and 9
• its purported denotation x.
We say 'purported' because there is no restriction that x actually be a possible denotation of r. For instance, it is a fact that (0 + 1) :: 2 ∈ N , and (0 + 1) :: 2 will not be the denotation of any r such that ∅ r : N (to check this, unpack Definition 3.11 below).
So our semantics inflates: there are usually elements in A that are not the denotation of any closed term. The reader should remain calm; there are also usually elements in function-spaces that are not the denotation of any closed term. The inflated elements in our semantics are an important part of our design. Notation 3.3. We will want to talk about nested pairs of the form (x 1 , (x 2 , . . . , (x n , x n+1 ))). Accordingly we will use list notation, writing x 1 :: x 2 for (x 1 , x 2 ) and x 1 :: · · · :: x n :: x n+1 for (x 1 , (x 2 , . . . , (x n , x n+1 ))). See for instance Remark 3.4, Figure 4 , and Subsection 3.3.2. Remark 3.5. Why do we inflate? Surely it is both simpler and more intuitive to take A to be { r | ∅ r : A}. We could do this, but then later on in Definition 3.11 we would not be able to give a denotation to terms by induction on their syntax.
The problem is that our types, and terms, are designed to permit generation of syntax at modal type. Thus, our design brief is to allow dynamic (runtime) generation of syntax. With the 'intuitive' definition above, there is no guarantee of an inductively decreasing quantity; the runtime can generate syntax of any size. To see this in detail, see Subsection 3.3.3.
The design of A in Figure 3 gets around this by insisting, at the very moment we assert some denotation of a term r of type A-i.e. some syntax r of type A-to simultaneously volunteer a denotation for r -i.e. an element in the denotation of A. (As mentioned in Remark 3.2 this denotation might be in some sense mistaken, but perhaps surprisingly that will not matter.)
Denotation of terms
We now set about interpreting terms in the denotation for types from Definition 3.1. The main definition is Definition 3.11. First, however, we need:
• some tools to handle the 'syntax and purported denotation' design of A (Definition 3.6); and • a suitable notion of valuation (Definition 3.7).
We then discuss the design of the definitions.
Recall from Notation 3.3 that we may use list notation and write r :: x for ( r, x).
Definition 3.6. We define hd and tl on x ∈ A (Definition 3.1) as follows:
• If x ∈ o or N or A→B then hd (x) = x and tl (x) is undefined.
• If ( r, x) ∈ A then hd (( r, x)) = r (first projection) and tl (( r, x)) = x (second projection).
Definition 3.7.
A valuation ς is a finite partial function on A ∪ X. Write ς[X:=x] for the valuation such that:
Definition 3.8. Suppose Γ is a typing context and ς a valuation. Write Γ ς when:
Remark 3.9. Unpacking Definition 3.1, clause 3 of Definition 3.8 (the one for X) means that ς(X) = r :: x where ∅ r : A and x ∈ A . Note also that by the form of the derivation rules in Figure 1 , it follows that ∅ r : A. So an intuition for ς(X) (cf. Remark 3.2) is this-"ς(X) is some closed syntax r (presented as r ∈ A ), and a candidate denotation for it x ∈ A ", -or more concisely this: "ς(X) is a pair of syntax and denotation." Definition 3.10. Write ς X for the unknowns substitution (Definition 2.15) such that
if ς(X) is defined, and ς X is undefined otherwise.
Definition 3.11. For each constant C : A other than , ⊥, and isapp fix some interpretation C H which is an element C H ∈ A . Suppose Γ ς and Γ r : A.
An interpretation of terms r ς is defined in Figure 4 .
In Subsection 3.3 we discuss the design of r ς , with examples. In Subsection 3.4 we prove some results about it.
Discussion of the denotation

About the term-formers
The denotations of and ⊥ are as expected. To give a denotation to an atom a, we just look it up using ς, also as expected. The definitions of λa:A.r and r r are also as standard.
As promised in Subsection 3.1, r ς returns a pair of a syntax and its denotation. 
Figure 4: Denotational semantics of terms of the modal type system isapp A is there to illustrate concretely how we can express programming on syntax of box types: it takes a syntax argument and checks whether it is a syntactic application. 10 Of course many other such functions are possible, and if we want them we can add them as further constants (just as we might add +, * , and/or recursion as constants, given a type for numbers). let X= (1+2) in We leave it to the reader to verify that (1+2) ∅ = (1+2) :: 3 and that X @ [X:= (1+2)] = 1+2. Note that '1 + 2' and ' (1 + 2)' are different; 1 + 2 denotes 3 whereas (1 + 2) denotes the pair 'The syntax 1 + 2, with associated extension 3'. In some very special cases where the set of possible denotations is rather small (finite or countable), the distinction between terms and their denotations can be hard to see, though it is still there. Usually sets of denotations are 'quite large' and sets of syntax are 'quite small', but sometimes this relationship is reversed: there are 'somewhat more' terms denoting numbers, than numbers 11 (but much fewer terms denoting functions from numbers to numbers than functions from numbers to numbers). See Corollary 3.15 and Example 3.16.
Note also the difference between the valuation ς = [X:= (1+2) :: 3] and the substitution [X:= (1+2)]. The first is a valuation because it maps X to N , the second is a substitution because it makes X to a term of type N.
Sometimes a mapping can be both valuation and substitution; for instance [a:=3] is a valuation (a maps to an element of N ), and is also a substitution.
Why the natural version does not work
Natural versions of Definitions 3.1 and 3.11 take
• the denotation of box type to be just boxed syntax rather than a pair of boxed syntax and denotation A = { r | ∅ r : A}, and • r ς = (rς X ) and
However, this seems not to work; ς(X) need not necessarily be a smaller term than X so the 'definition' above is not inductive. This is not just a hypothetical issue: a term of the form let X=s in r ς may cause ς(X) to be equal to s ς , and s might generate syntax of any size. The previous paragraph is not a mathematical proof; aside from anything else we have left the notion 'size of term' unspecified. The reader can experiment with different candidates: obvious 'subterm of', 'depth of', and 'number of symbols' of are all vulnerable to the problem described above, as is a more sophisticated notion of size which gives X size ω the least infinite cardinal-since we can generate multiple copies of terms of the form let X=r in s, and even if this is closed it can contain bound copies of X.
Example: denotation of exp 2
Recalling Subsection 2.3.4, we calculate the denotation of exp 2 ∅ where exp is specified by:
We sketch part of the calculation:
11 6 + 5 and 5 + 6 denote the same number, whose calculation we leave as an exercise to the energetic reader.
Example: denotation of terms for axioms (T) and (4)
In Subsection 2.3.1 we considered the terms λa: A.let X=a in X @ : A→A and λa: A.let X=a in X @ : A→ A which implement the modal logic axioms (T) and (4). We now describe their denotations, without working:
• λa: A.let X=a in X @ ∅ maps r :: tl ∈ A to tl.
• λa: A.let X=a in X @ ∅ maps r :: tl ∈ A to r :: r :: tl.
Results about the denotation
We need a technical result and some notation for Proposition 3.13:
Suppose X ∈ dom(ς). By Definition 3.10 ς X (X) = hd (ς(X)). By Definition 3.8 ς X (X) ∈ A for some A. Unpacking Figure 3 this implies that ς X (X) = r for some ∅ r : A, and we are done.
Proposition 3.13 relies on a dual role played by syntax in ς X . It is coerced between denotation and syntax in ( I), and 'in the other direction' in (Ext). Proposition 3.13 expresses this important dynamic in the mathematics of the paper. Technically, the result is needed for the case of ( I) in the proof of Theorem 3.14. Recall the notation Γ| U from Notation 2.12.
Proposition 3.13. Suppose Γ r : A and Γ ς. Then Γ| A r ς X : A. (ς X is defined in Definition 3.10; its action on r is defined in Definition 2.18.)
Proof. By Lemma 3.12 Γ ς X . By Proposition 2.23 Γ r ς X : A. By Lemma 2.19 fa(rς X ) = fa(r). Now it is a fact that fa(r) ⊆ dom(Γ| A ), so by Proposition 2.13 Γ| A r ς X : A as required.
Theorem 3.14 (Soundness). If Γ r : A and Γ ς then r ς is defined and r ς ∈ A .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ r : A. Most of the rules follow by properties of sets and functions. We consider the interesting cases:
• Rule ( I). Suppose Γ r : A and fa(r)=∅ so that by ( I) Γ r : A. Suppose Γ ς. Then by inductive hypothesis r ς ∈ A . Also, by Proposition 3.13 ∅ rς X : A It follows by Definition 3.1 that r ς = ( (rς X )) :: r ς ∈ A as required.
• Rule ( E). Suppose Γ, X: A r : B and Γ s : A so that by ( E) Γ let X=s in r :
A. Suppose Γ ς. By inductive hypothesis for Γ s : A we have s ς ∈ A and so there is some term s and some x ∈ A such that ( s ) Suppose Γ, X: A ς. Unpacking Definition 3.8, this means that ς(X) = ( s ) :: x for some s and x such that ∅ s : A and x ∈ A . From Definition 3.11 X @ ς = x ∈ A as required.
• Rule (Hyp). Suppose Γ, a:A ς. By Definition 3.8 this means that ς(a) ∈ A . By Definition 3.11 a ς = ς(a). The result follows.
Corollary 3.15. There is no term s such that ∅ s : (N→N)→ (N→N) is typable and such that the map λx∈N N .hd (
Proof. N→N is an uncountable set whereas hd ( (N→N) ) = {r | ∅ r : N→N} is countable. The result follows from Theorem 3.14.
Example 3.16. By Corollary 3.15 there can be no term representing a function which reifies an element of A to corresponding syntax. Of course, there might be a term which reifies those elements of A that are representable by syntax. For specific 'sufficiently small' A, this might even include all of A .
For example, if A = N then the following function does the job:
Remark 3.17. Similar arguments to those used in Corollary 3.15 and Example 3.16 also justify why the Haskell programming language has a Show function for certain types, but not for function types. 12 We chose full function spaces in Figure 4 , so that the models for which we prove soundness in Theorem 3.14 would be large, and we did that so that the proof of Corollary 3.15 would become relatively easy. Careful consideration has gone into the precise designs of B A and A .
We will later on in Corollary 6.11 prove a similar result for the contextual system, and then later still in Corollary 7.7 surprisingly leverage this to a result which even works for functions to all of (N→N) rather than just to the (much smaller) hd ( (N→N) ).
Reduction
We have Theorem 3.14 (soundness) and Corollary 3.15 (impossibility in general of reifying denotation to syntax). The other major property of interest is that typing and denotation are consistent with a natural notion of reduction on terms.
So we now turn our attention to the lemmas leading up to Proposition 4.10 and Theorem 4.11.
Results concerning substitution on atoms
Recall from Definition 2.18 the definition of the atoms-substitution action. Lemma 4.1 is a counterpart to Proposition 3.13. We had to prove Proposition 3.13 earlier because calculating the denotation r ς in Figure 4 involves calculating rς X (an unknowns-substitution applied to a term). 13 Now we are working towards reduction, and β-reduction can generate atomssubstitution, so we need Lemma 4.1. Proof. By a routine induction on the typing of r. We consider three cases:
• The case of ( I). Suppose Γ, a:B r : A and fa(r)=∅ so that Γ, a:B r : A by ( I). But then by Lemma 2.21 r[a:=s] = r, and the result follows from Proposition 2.13.
• The case of (Ext) is similar to that of ( I).
• The case of ( E). Using the fact from Definition 2.18 that Proof. By a routine induction on the derivation of Γ, a:B r : A (Figure 1 ). We consider three cases:
• The case of ( I). We use Lemma 2.21 and Proposition 2.13 (as in the case of ( I) in the proof of Lemma 4.1).
• The case of (Ext). By (Ext) Γ, a:B, X:A X @ : A. By definition X @ [a:=s] = X @ . We use Proposition 2.13.
• The case of (Hyp) for a. By (Hyp) Γ, a:B a : B. By assumption Γ, a:B ς so unpacking Definition 3.8, ς(a) ∈ B . By Figure 4 ς(a) = a ς , and we are done. Proposition 4.3 can be viewed as a denotational counterpart of Proposition 2.13: Proposition 4.3. Suppose Γ r : A and Γ ς and Γ ς . Suppose ς(a) = ς (a) for every a ∈ fa(r) and ς(X) = ς (X) for every X ∈ fa(r).
Then r ς = r ς .
Proof. By a routine induction on r. Proof. We unpack the cases of λ and application in Definition 3.11. Proof. We just unpack the clause for let X=s in r in Figure 4 (well-definedness is from Theorem 3.14).
Results concerning substitution on unknowns
Lemma 4.6. Suppose θ is an unknowns-substitution (Definition 2.15). Suppose X ∈ dom(θ) and suppose fu(θ(Z)) = ∅ for every Z ∈ dom(θ).
Proof. By a routine induction on r. The interesting case is X @ , for which it is easy to check that: Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ, X: B r : A.
• The case of ( I). Suppose Γ, X: B r : A and fa(r) = ∅ so that by ( I) Γ, X: B r : A. We sketch the necessary reasoning: • The case of (Ext) for X. By (Ext) Γ, X: B X @ : B. Then we reason as follows: (β) Remark 4.9. We do not have a rule that if r → β r then r → β r . This would be wrong because it does not respect the integrity of the syntax of a term; syntax, in denotation, does not inherently reduce.
We do however allow reduction under a λ. This is purely a design choice; we are interested in making as many terms as possible β-convertible, and less immediately interested in this paper in finding nice notions of β-normal form. If we did not have a denotational semantics then we might have to be more sensitive to such questions (because normal forms are important for consistency)-because we do have a denotational semantics, we obtain consistency via soundness and the precise notion of normal form is not so vital. Proof. By a routine induction on r. The case of (β) (λa:A.r)r → β r[a:=r ] follows by Lemma 4.1; that of (β ) follows by Proposition 3.13. Proof. By induction on the derivation of r → β r .
• The case of (β) follows by Lemmas 4.2 and 4.4.
• The case of (β ) follows by Lemmas 4.5 and 4.7.
Syntax and typing of the system with contextual types
The modal type system is beautiful, but is a little too weak for some applications. The issue is that X ranges over closed syntax. If we are working under some λ-abstractions, we may well find this limiting; we want to work with open syntax so that we can refer to the enclosing binder. This really matters, because it affects the programs we can write. For instance in the example of exponentiation from Subsection 2.3.4, the issue of working under a λ-abstraction forced us to generate unwanted β-redexes.
The contextual system is one way to get around this. Syntax is still closed, but the notion of closure is liberalised by introducing a context into the modality; to see the critical difference, compare the ([]I) rule in Figure 6 with the ( I) rule from Figure 1 . The interested reader can see how this allows us to write a nicer program for exponentiation, which does not generate β-redexes, in Subsection 6.2.2.
Syntax of the contextual system
Notation 5.1. The contextual system needs many vectors of types and atoms-and-types. For clarity, we write these vectors subscripted, for instance:
1 is shorthand for {a 1 :A 1 , . . . , a n :A n }.
• {a i } n 1 is shorthand for {a 1 , . . . , a n }. • λ(x i :A i ) n 1 .r is shorthand for λx 1 :A 1 . . . . λx n :A n .r.
• [a i :=x i ] n 1 will be shorthand for the map taking a i to x i for 1≤i≤n and undefined elsewhere (Definition 5.10).
We may omit the interval where it is understood or irrelevant, so for instance {a i } and {a i } i are both shorthand for the same thing: "{a 1 , . . . , a n } for some n whose precise value we will never need to reference", and (A i )→A is shorthand for "(A i ) n 1 →A for some n whose precise value we will never need to reference".
We take atoms and unknowns as in Definition 2.1. Definition 5.3. Fix a set of constants C to each of which is assigned a type type(C). We write C : A as shorthand for 'C is a constant and type(C) = A'. We insist that constants include the following:
Definition 5.2. Define types inductively by:
We may omit the type subscripts where they are clear from context or do not matter. 
, if we map -to [ ]-(the empty context) and -@ to -@().
The important extra complexity is in X@(r i ) n 1 ; when X is instantiated by a substitution θ, this triggers an atoms-substitution of the form [a i :=r i ] n 1 . See Definition 5.11.
Definition 5.6. Define free atoms fa(r) and free unknowns fu(r) by:
Definition 5.7. We take a to be bound in r in λa:A.r and a 1 , . . . , a n to be bound in r in [a i :A] n 1 r, and we take X to be bound in r in let X=s in r. We take syntax up to α-equivalence as usual. For example: A typing sequent is a tuple Γ r : A of a typing context, a term, and a type.
Define the valid typing sequents of the contextual modal type system by the rules in Figure 6 .
Recall the notation Γ| U from Notation 2.12. Proposition 5.9 repeats Proposition 2.13 for the contextual system: Proposition 5.9. If Γ r : A and Γ | fu(r)∪fa(r) = Γ| fu(r)∪fa(r) then Γ r : A.
Substitution
Definition 5.10 reflects Definition 2.15 for the richer syntax of terms:
Definition 5.10. An (atoms-)substitution σ is a finite partial function from atoms A to terms. σ will range over atoms-substitutions. Write dom(σ) for the set {a | σ(a) defined} Write id for the identity substitution, such that dom(σ) = ∅. Write [a i :=x i ] n 1 for the map taking a i to x i for 1≤i≤n and undefined elsewhere. An (unknowns-)substitution θ is a finite partial function from unknowns X to terms such that if θ(X) is defined then θ(X) = [a i :A i ] n 1 r for some r with fa(r) ⊆ {a 1 , . . . , a n } (so fa(θ(X)) = ∅ for every X ∈ dom(θ)).
θ will range over unknowns-substitutions. We write dom(θ), id, and [X i :=t i ] n 1 just as for atoms-substitutions (we will be most interested in the case that n = 1).
We also reflect Definition 2.16 and write fa(σ) and fu(θ), but using the notions of 'free atoms' and 'free unknowns' from Definition 5.6. The definition is formally identical: Remark 5.12. The capture-avoidance side-conditions of Definition 5.11 (of the form ' * ∈ fa(σ)' or ' * ∈ fu(θ)') can be guaranteed by α-renaming.
Strictly speaking the case of (X@(r i ) n 1 )θ introduces a partiality into the notion of substitution action; we assume that θ(X) = [a i :A i ] m 1 s and for this to make sense it must be that n = m; if n = m then the definition is not well-defined. However, for well-typed syntax this is guaranteed not to happen, and since this is the only case we will care about, we will never notice this. We conclude this section with some important definitions and results about the interaction of substitution and typing, which will be needed for Theorem 6.10.
Definition 5.13 reflects Definition 2.22, but we need Γ σ as well as Γ θ:
Similarly write Γ σ when if a ∈ dom(σ) then a:A ∈ Γ for some A and Γ σ(a) : A.
Lemma 5.14. fa(rθ) = fa(r) where rθ is defined.
Proof. By a routine induction on r using our assumption of Definition 5.10 that if X ∈ dom(θ) then fa(θ(X)) = ∅.
Lemma 5.15 reflects Lemma 4.1. However, unlike was the case for the modal system, it is needed for Proposition 5.16/2.23 because the case of (X@(r i ))θ in Definition 5.11 triggers an atoms-substitution.
Lemma 5.15. Suppose Γ r : A and Γ σ. Then Γ rσ : A.
Proof. By routine inductions on the derivation of Γ r : A.
Proposition 5.16 reflects Proposition 2.23 and is needed for soundness of the denotation. The proof is significantly more complex, because of the atoms-substitution that can be introduced by the case of (X@(s j ))θ. This is handled in the proof below using Lemma 5.15. 
Figure 9: Denotational semantics for terms of the contextual system
We could now give a theory of reduction for the contextual system, following the definition of reduction for the modal system in Subsection 4.3. However, we will skip over this; the interested reader is referred elsewhere [NP05] . What is more interesting, from the point of view of this paper, is the models we define for the contextual system, which we come to next.
Contextual models
Denotational semantics
Definition 6.1 is like Definition 3.1, except that instead of box types, we have contextual types: Definition 6.1. Define A the interpretation of types by induction in Figure 8 .
Definition 6.2. A valuation ς is a finite partial function on A ∪ X.
We define ς[X:=x] and ς[a:=x] just as in Definition 3.7.
Definition 6.3. Write ς X for the substitution (Definition 5.10) such that ς X (X) = hd (ς(X)) if ς(X) is defined, and ς X (X) is undefined if ς(X) is undefined.
Definition 6.4. If Γ is a typing context then write Γ ς when: Definition 6.6. For each constant C : A other than , ⊥, and isapp fix some interpretation C H which is an element C H ∈ A . Suppose Γ ς and Γ r : A.
An interpretation of terms r ς is defined in Figure 9 .
Remark 6.7. Definition 6.6 is in the same spirit as Definition 3.11, but now the modal types are contextual; the modal box contains a context a 1 :A 1 , . . . , a n :A n . When we calculate X@(r i ) n 1 ς the denotation of X@(r i ) n 1 , the denotations of the terms r i provide denotations for the variables in that context.
A, and we are done.
Lemma 6.9. Suppose Γ r : A and Γ ς. Then Γ| A rς X : A.
Proof. By Lemma 6.8 Γ ς X . By Proposition 5.16 Γ r ς X : A. By Lemma 5.14 fa(rς X ) = fa(r).
It is a fact that fa(r) ⊆ dom(Γ| A ), so by Proposition 2.13 Γ| A r ς X : A as required. • Rule (Ext). Suppose Γ, X:
• Rule (Hyp). Suppose Γ, a:A ς. By Definition 6.4 this means that ς(a) ∈ A . By Definition 6.6 a ς = ς(a). The result follows.
• Rule (→I). Suppose Γ, a:A r : B so that by (→I) Γ λa:A.r : A→B. Suppose Γ ς and choose any x ∈ A . It follows that Γ, a:A ς[a:=x] and so by inductive hypothesis that r ς[a:=x] ∈ B . Since x ∈ A was arbitrary, by Definition 6.6 we have that 
Typings and denotations in the contextual system
The examples from Subsection 2.3 transfer to the contextual system if we translate -to [ ]-and -@ to -@() (cf. Remark 5.5). So the reader can look to Subsection 2.3 for some simpler examples.
We now consider some slightly more advanced ideas.
Moving between [A]B and [ ](A→B)
We can move between the types It is routine to check that the typings above are derivable using the rules in Figure 6 .
Intuitively, we can write the following: The fact that g introduces a β-redex reflects the fact that we have given our language facilities to build up syntax-but not to destroy it. We can build a precise inverse to f if we give ourselves an explicit destructor for λ-abstraction.
So for instance, we can give ourselves option types and then admit a constant symbol 
The example of exponentiation, revisited
Recall from Subsection 2.3.4 the discussion of exponentiation and how in the modal system the natural term to meta-program exponentiation introduced β-reducts.
The following term implements exponentiation:
This term does not generate β-reducts in the way we noted of the corresponding term from N]r as a 'translucent lambda', and think of X@(r i ) as a corresponding application. We can use these to carry out computation-a rather weak computation; just a few substitutions as formalised in the clause for X@(r i ) i in Figure 7 -but this computation occurs inside a modality, which we could not do with an ordinary λ-abstraction. Now might be a good moment to return to the clause for [a i :A i ]r in Figure 9 :
We see the λ-abstraction in the semantics, and we also see its 'translucency': the λ-abstraction appears in the extension, but is also associated with a non-functional intension.
Syntax to denotation
There is a schema of unpack programs, parameterised over (a i :A i ) n 1 which evaluates syntax with n free atoms:
We can express the following connection between unpack (which is a term) and tl (which is a function on denotations):
Proof. By long but routine calculations unpacking Figure 9 .
As an aside, note that if we have diverging terms ω i : A i then we can combine this with unpack to obtain a term ∅ λa:
In a call-by-name evaluation strategy, this loops forever if evaluation tries to refer to one of the (diverging) arguments.
Modal-style axioms
As in Subsection 2.3.1 we can write functions corresponding to axioms from the necessity fragment of S4:
(Of course, T is just a special case of unpack above.)
More general contexts
Versions of the terms 4 and K exist for non-empty contexts. For example, we can have a schema of 4 Γ axioms, for any context Γ:
Here and below we abuse notation by putting [Γ] in the type; we intend the types in Γ, with the variables removed. Above, id Γ is the identity substitution defined inductively on Γ by
Note that the terms realising 4 Γ are not uniform, because the substitution id Γ is not a term in the language; it is a meta-level concept, producing different syntax depending on Γ.
Similarly, we have a schema of K Γ terms:
. . . and terms exposing the structural rules of contexts:
We give weaken in full generality and then for brevity contract and exchange only for twoelement contexts. If we think in terms of multimodal logic [GKWZ03] these terms 'factor', 'fuse', and 'rearrange' contexts/modalities. 
Shapeliness
We have seen semantics to both the modal and contextual type systems. We have also noted that, like function-spaces, our semantics inflates. We discussed why in Remark 3.5 and Subsection 3.3.3.
In this section we delve deeper into the fine structure of the denotation to isolate a property of those parts of the denotation that can be described by syntax (Definition 7.1). This is an attractive well-formedness/well-behavedness property in its own right, and furthermore, we can exploit it to strengthen Corollaries 3.15 and 6.11 (see Corollary 7.7).
Definition 7.1. Define the shapely x ∈ A inductively by the rules in Figure 10 .
Call ς shapely when:
• ς(X) is shapely for every X ∈ dom(ς).
• ς(a) is shapely for every a ∈ dom(ς).
Intuitively, x is shapely when, if it is intensional (so x is in some [A i ]A ) then the intension hd (x) and the extension tl (x) match up. In particular, this means that elements in B , N , or N→N -are automatically shapely. Conversely, x is not shapely if it has an intension and an extension and they do not match up. The paradigmatic non-shapely element is [ ]0 :: 1, since the intension 'the syntax 0' does not match the extension 'the number 1'. Lemma 7.2.
1. If x ∈ B→A is shapely and y ∈ B is shapely, then so is xy ∈ A .
Proof. The first two parts follow from the form of the inductive definition in Figure 10 . The third part is a simple application of (ShapeFun), noting that by (ShapeN) every n ∈ N is shapely.
We can combine Lemmas 7.2 and 6.12 to get a nice corollary of shapeliness (unpack is from Subsection 6.2.3):
Proof. Suppose x ∈ [A i ]A is shapely, so that by part 2 of Lemma 7.2 x = hd (x) ∅ . We apply tl to both sides and use Lemma 6.12. Proof. By a routine induction on the derivation of Γ r : A, similar to the proof of Lemma 4.7.
Corollary 7.5. Suppose Γ r : A, Γ ς, and ς is shapely. Then r ς = r ς X ς| A .
Proof. First, we note that the effect of ς X can be obtained by concatenating [X:=hd (ς(X))] for every X ∈ fu(r). The order does not matter because by construction hd (ς(X)) is closed syntax (no free variables). Furthermore since ς is shapely, ς(X) = hd (ς(X)) ∅ so we can write ς as
where here [X:=x X | X ∈ X ] is the map taking X to x X for every X ∈ X . 15 We now use Lemma 7.4 for [X:=ς(X)] for each X ∈ fu(r), and Proposition 5.9.
Proposition 7.6. Suppose Γ r : A and suppose Γ ς. Then if ς is shapely then so is r ς .
Proof. By induction on the typing Γ r : A (Figure 6 ).
• The case of (Hyp) is immediate because by assumption ς(a) is shapely.
• The case of (Const) is also immediate (provided that all semantics for constants are shapely). is shapely.
• The case of (→E). Suppose Γ r : A→B and Γ r : A so that by (→E) Γ r r : B.
By inductive hypothesis r ς and r ς are both shapely. By part 1 of Lemma 7.2 so is r r ς = r ς r ς . 15 Strictly speaking we also need a version of Proposition 4.3 for the contextual system; this is not hard. It is clear that part 1 of Corollary 7.7 can be directly adapted to the modal system from Section 2.
as a (relative) comonad
We noted as early as Remark 2.14 that looks like a comonad. In this section, we show that this is indeed the case.
Before doing this, we would like to convince the reader that this is obviously impossible. True, we have natural maps A → A (evaluation) and A → A (quotation). However, if is a comonad then it has to be a functor on some suitable category, so we would expect some natural map in (A→B) → ( A→ B). This seems unlikely because if we had this, then we could take A to be a unit type (populated by one element) and B = (N→N) and thus generate a natural map from N→N to (N→N). But how would we do this in the light of Corollaries 6.11 and Corollary 7.7? Even where closed syntax exists for a denotation, there may be many different choices of closed syntax to represent the same denotation, further undermining our chances of finding natural assignments. ' as a comonad' seems doomed.
This problem is circumvented by the 'trick' of considering a category in which each denotation must be associated with syntax; we do not insist that the syntax and denotation match. This is essentially the same idea as inflation in Remark 3.2 (but applied in the other direction; in Remark 3.2 we inflated by adding a purported denotation to every syntax; here we are inflating by adding a purported syntax to every denotation). In the terminology of Definition 7.1 we can say that we do not insist on shapeliness. We simply insist that some syntax be provided.
Modulo this 'trick', becomes a well-behaved comonad after all.
as a comonad
Notation 8.1. Write π 1 for first projection and π 2 for second projection.
That is, π 1 (x, y) = x and π 2 (x, y) = y.
Note that δ A is an arrow from A to A.
Lemma 8.9. δ A maps s ::
Proof. By a routine calculation on the definitions: Figure 4 Proposition 8.10. is a comonad.
Proof. We need to check that
Both calculations are routine. We consider just the second one. Consider s :: r :: x ∈ A . Then The shaded part is the part that gets 'deleted'. In the second case we use Lemma 8.9.
as a relative comonad
Recall that in the previous subsection we represented as a comonad on a category with the 'trick' of associating syntax to every denotation.
It is possible to put this in a broader context using the notion of relative comonad.
Definition 8.11. Following [ACU10] , a relative comonad consists of the following information:
• Two categories J and C and a functor J : J → C. 17 • A functor T : J → C.
• For every X ∈ J an arrow δ X : T X → JX ∈ C (the unit).
• For every X, Y ∈ J and arrow k : T X → JY ∈ C, an arrow k * : T X → T Y (the Kleisli extension).
Furthermore, we insist on the following equalities:
Definition 8.12. Take C to have objects types A and arrows elements of B A = A→B -this is simply the natural category arising from the denotational semantics of Figure 3 . Take J to be the category of Definition 8.4. Take J to map A ∈ J to A ∈ C and to map f ∈ B A to itself.
Take T to map A ∈ J to A ∈ C and to map f ∈ B A to f from Definition 8.2.
Proposition 8.13. Definition 8.12 determines a relative comonad on C.
It is slightly simplified, but accurate, to describe relative (co)monads as being for the case where we have an operator that is nearly (co)monadic but the category in question has 'too many objects'. By that view, is a comonad on the full subcategory of C over modal types. Now the intuition of modal types A is 'closed syntax', so it may be worth explicitly noting here that this full subcategory is not just a category of syntax. Each A contains for each term ∅ r : A also a copy of A , because we inflate.
Conclusions
The intuition realised by the denotation of A in this paper means 'typable closed syntax of the same language, of type A'. This is difficult to get right because it is self-referential; if we are careless then the undecidable runtime impinges on the inductively defined denotation. We noted this in Subsection 3.3.3.
For that reason we realised this intuition by an 'inflated' reading of A as 'closed syntax, and purported denotation of that syntax'. As noted in Remark 3.2, there is no actual restriction that r :: x ∈ A needs to match up, in that r must have denotation x.
When r and x do match up we say that r :: x is shapely. This is Definition 7.1, and we use this notion for our culminating result in Corollary 7.7, which entails that there is no unform family of terms of type A→ A.
The proof of this involves a beautiful interplay between syntax and denotation, which also illustrates the usefulness of denotational techniques; we can use a sound model to show that certain things cannot happen in the syntax, because if they did, they would have to happen in the model. Future work. One avenue for future work is to note that our denotation is sets based, and so this invites generalisation to nominal sets semantics [GP01] .
Perhaps we could leverage this to design a language which combines the simplicity of the purely modal system with the expressivity of contextual terms. Specifically, nominal sets are useful for giving semantics to open terms [GM11, Gab11] and we hope to develop a language in which we can retain the modal type system but relax the condition that fa(r) = ∅ in ( I) in Figure 1 (much as the contextual system does, but in the 'nominal' approach we would not add types to the modality).
The underlying motivation here is that the contextual system is 'eager' in accounting for free variables-we need to express all the variables we intend to use in the contextual modal type, by putting their types in the modality. We might prefer to program on open syntax in a 'lazy' fashion, by stating that the syntax may be open, but not specifying its free variables explicitly in the type.
Note that this is not the same thing as programming freely on open syntax. Free variables would still be accounted for in the typing context (leading to some form of dynamic linking as and when open syntax is unboxed and evaluated; for an example of a λ-calculus view of dynamic linking, though not meta-programming, see [AFZ03] ). So all variables would be eventually accounted for in the typing context, but they would not need to be listed in the type. This is another reason for the specific design of our denotional semantics and taking the denotation of A to be specifically closed syntax; we hope to directly generalise this using nominal techniques so that A can also denote (atoms-)open syntax. This is future work.
On the precise meaning of Corollary 7.7. Corollary 7.7 depends on the fact that we admitted no constants of type (N→N)→ (N→N). We may be able to admit such a constant, representing a function that takes denotation and associates to it some 'dummy syntax' chosen in some fixed but arbitrarly manner.
So Corollary 7.7 does not (and should not) prove that terms of type (N→N)→ (N→N) are completely impossible-only that they do not arise from the base system and cannot exist unless we explicitly choose to put them in there.
Technical notes on the jump in complexity from modal to contextual system. We noted in the introduction that Sections 2 and 5, and Sections 3 and 6 are parallel developments of the syntax and examples of the modal and contextual systems.
We briefly survey technical details of how these differences manifest themselves.
• The contextual system enriches the modal system with types in the modality. The increase in expressivity is exemplified in Subsection 6.2.2. • In the contextual system and not in the modal system, instantiation of unknowns can trigger an atoms-substitution (see Definition 5.11) leading to a kind of 'cascade effect'. This turns out to be terminating, well-behaved, and basically harmless-but this has to be verified, and that brings some specific technical material forward in the proofs for the contextual case that is not so prominent in the purely modal case (notably, Lemma 5.15). Related work and monads. Famously, Moggi proposed to model computation using a monad [Mog91] . Let us write it as ♦A. 18 This type is intuitively populated by 'computations of type A'. The unit arrow A→♦A takes a value of type A and returns the trivial computation that just returns A.
The difference from the comonad of this paper in that our A is populated by closed syntax, and not by computation.
If we have an element of N N then it is easy to build a computation that just returns that value; it is however not easy-and may be impossible-to exhibit closed syntax to represent this computation.
We could add a constant to our syntax for each of the uncountably many functions from natural numbers to natural numbers. This would be mathematically fine-but not particularly implementable. We do not assume this.
Closed syntax is of course related to computation, and we can make this formal: Given an element in (N→N) we can map it to a computation, just by executing it. So intuitively there is an arrow A → ♦A. In the modal logic tradition this is called axiom (D).
In summary: we propose that the Moggi-style monads corresponds to a modal ♦, whereas CMTT-style is a modal and corresponds to a comonadic structure.
See also [Kob97, BdP00, AMdPR01] , where the operator of several constructive variants of S4 (not equivalent to the version we presented here) is modeled as comonads.
Brief survey of applications of calculi. Logic and denotation, not implementation, are the focus of this paper, but the ' -calculi' considered in this paper have their motivation in implementation and indeed they were specifically designed to address implementational concerns. We therefore give a brief survey of how (contextual) modal types have been useful in the more applied end of computer science.
The connection of the modal calculus with partial evaluation and staged computation was noticed by Davies and Pfenning [DP01, PD01] , and subsequently used as a language for run-time code generation by Wickline et al. [WLP98] . The contextual variant of as a basis for meta-programming and modeling of higher-order abstract syntax was proposed by Nanevski and Pfenning [NP05] , and subsequently used to reason about optimised implementation of higher-order unification in Twelf [PP03] , which could even be scaled to dependent types [NPP08] .
Recently, the contextual flavor of the system has been used in meta-programming applications for reasoning and programming with higher-order abstract syntax by Pientka and collaborators [Pie08, PD08, FP10, CP12] .
Relationship between the formulation with meta-variables and labeled natural deductions. The syntax of terms from Definition 2.6 does not follow instantly from the syntax of types from Definition 2.2; in particular, the use of a two-level syntax (also reminiscent of the two levels of nominal terms [UPG04] ) is a design choice, not an inevitability.
The usual way to present inference systems based on modal logic is to have a propositional (or variable) context where each proposition is labeled by the 'world' at which it is true [Sim94] .
When S4 is considered, we take advantage of reflexivity and transitivity of the Kripke frame to simplify the required information to two kinds of facts:
1. What holds at the current world, but not necessarily in all future worlds. 2. What holds in the current world and also in all future worlds.
By this view, the first kind of fact corresponds to atoms a, and the second kind of fact corresponds to unknowns X. So this can be seen as the origin of the two-level structure of our syntax in this paper.
The interested reader can find the modal (non-contextual) version of our type-system presented using the labeled approach in a paper by Davies and Pfenning [DP01] , and each stage of computation is indeed viewed as world in a Kripke frame.
CMTT and nominal terms. Nominal terms were developed in [UPG03, UPG04] and feature a two-level syntax, just like CMTT. That is made very clear in this paper, where the first author imported the nominal terms terminology of atoms and unknowns.
The syntax of this paper is not fully nominal-the [a i ]r of the contextual system may look like a nominal abstraction, but there are no suspended permutation π·X (instead, we have types in the modality). One contribution of this paper is to make formal, by a denotation, the precise status of the two levels of variable in CMTT.
So we can note that the abstraction for atoms is functional abstraction in CMTT whereas the abstraction for atoms in nominal terms is nominal atoms-abstraction; 19 unknowns of nominal terms range over elements of nominal sets, whereas unknowns of CMTT range over ordinary sets functionally abstracted over finitely many arguments; the notion of equivariance (symmetry up to permuting atoms) characteristic of all nominal techniques is absent in CMTT (the closest we get is a term like exchange B,C in Subsection 6.2.4); and in contrast the self-reflective character of CMTT is absent from nominal terms and the logics built out of it [Gab12] . So in spite of some structural parallels between CMTT and nominal terms in that both are two-level, there are also significant differences.
As noted above, there is a parallel between CMTT and Kripke structures, that is made more explicit in [DP01] . A direct connection between nominal terms and Kripke semantics has never been made, but the first author at least has been aware of it as a possibility, where 'future worlds' corresponds to 'more substitutions arriving'. Also as discussed above, an obvious next step is to develop a modified modal syntax which takes on board more 'nominal' ideas, applied to the modal intuitions which motivate the λ-calculus of this paper. This is future work.
The syntax of this paper, and previous work. The modal and contextual systems which we give semantics to in this paper, are taken from previous work. Specifically, Definition 2.6 corresponds to [PD01] , Definition 5.4 corresponds to [NPP08] , Figure 1 corresponds to [PD01] and Figure 6 to [NPP08] .
We cannot give specific definition references in the citations to [NPP08] and [PD01] , because those papers never give a specific definition of their syntax. If they did, then they would correspond as described. We do feel that this paper does make some contribution in terms of presentation, and the exposition and definitions here may be tailored to a slightly different community.
